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ABSTRACT: The Affordable Care Act’s medical loss ratio (MLR) rule requires health 
insurers to pay out at least 80 percent of premiums for medical claims and quality improve-
ment, as opposed to administrative costs and profits. This issue brief examines whether 
insurers have reduced administrative costs and profit margins in response to the new MLR 
rule. In 2011, the first year under the rule, insurers reduced administrative costs nation-
ally, with the greatest decrease—over $785 million—occurring in the large-group market. 
Small-group and individual markets decreased their administrative costs by about $200 
million each. In the individual market, insurers passed these savings on to consumers by 
reducing their profits even more than administrative costs. But in the large- and small-
group markets, lower administrative costs were offset by increased profits of a similar 
amount. Stronger measures may be needed if consumers are to benefit from reduced over-
head costs in the group insurance markets.
            
OVERVIEW
One of the most important consumer protections in the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act is the regulation of health insurers’ medical loss ratios 
(MLRs). The MLR is a key financial measure that shows the percentage of 
premium dollars a health insurer pays for medical care and health care quality 
improvement expenses, as opposed to the portion allocated to overhead in the 
form of profits, administrative costs, and sales expenses.1
The Affordable Care Act sets minimum MLRs for insurers to reduce 
overhead and thus the ultimate cost of insurance to consumers and the govern-
ment. As of January 1, 2011, insurers offering comprehensive major medical 
policies must maintain an MLR of at least 80 percent in the individual and small-
group markets and 85 percent in the large-group market.2 Limiting insurers’ medi-
cal loss ratio can benefit consumers in two distinct ways:
1. Insurers that pay out less than these percentages on medical care and 
quality improvement must rebate the difference to their subscribers.
To learn more about new publications 
when they become available, visit the 
Fund’s Web site and register to receive 
e-mail alerts.
Commonwealth Fund pub. 1634 
Vol. 26
The mission of The Commonwealth 
Fund is to promote a high performance 
health care system. The Fund carries 
out this mandate by supporting 
independent research on health care 
issues and making grants to improve 
health care practice and policy. Support 
for this research was provided by 
The Commonwealth Fund. The views 
presented here are those of the authors 
and not necessarily those of The 
Commonwealth Fund or its directors, 
officers, or staff.
For more information about this study, 
please contact:
Michael J. McCue, D.B.A.
Professor
Department of Health Administration
School of Allied Health Professions
Virginia Commonwealth University
mccue@vcu.edu
2 The coMMonwealTh Fund
2. To avoid having to pay rebates, insurers may 
reduce overhead (consisting of administrative  
costs and profits) and restrain premium increases.
Consumers received their first MLR rebates 
in August 2012—amounting to over $1 billion—from 
health insurers that failed to meet the requirements. 
Other studies have examined the size and distribution 
of these rebates.3 This analysis focuses on the second 
type of consumer benefit: whether insurers reduced 
their administrative costs without increasing corpo-
rate profits, so that administrative savings are passed 
on to consumers in the form of restraining premium 
increases, rather than benefitting insurers’ bottom lines.
To understand how insurers might respond to 
MLR limits, it helps to think of insurance premiums 
being devoted to three possible uses. As shown in 
Exhibit 1, the major use of premiums is to pay medical 
claims, but a smaller portion is devoted to overhead, in 
the form of administrative costs and corporate profits. 
With the MLR regulation insurers are now required 
to limit what they devote to overhead. The goal is to 
encourage insurers to reduce premiums a commensu-
rate amount in order to benefit consumers, as shown in 
Scenario 2.
Suppose, for instance, that the total premium 
shown in Scenario 1 is $1,000, with $200 devoted 
to administration, $50 retained as profit, and the rest 
($750) spent on medical claims. With only 75 percent 
of the premium spent on medical claims, the MLR rule 
would require this insurer to pay a rebate of $50 if it 
were in the individual or small-group markets (80% of 
$1,000 = $800 – $750 = $50) or $100 if it were in the  
large-group market (85% of 1,000 = $850 – $750 = $100). 
That rebate either would eliminate the insurer’s profit 
of $50 (in the case of individual/small-group markets) 
or cause it to take a $50 loss in the large-group market.
To avoid paying a rebate, the insurer might 
reduce its administrative costs and profits and lower 
its premium, as shown in Scenario 2. For instance, if 
the insurer reduces administrative costs from $200 to 
$100 and lowers profits from $50 to $30, the resulting 
premium would be $880 ($100 + $30 + $750 = $880). 
Then, the $750 the insurer spends on medical claims 
would meet the MLR rule (85% of $880 = $748). With 
a premium that is $120 lower, consumers would be 
even better off under this scenario than with the $50 or 
$100 rebates under Scenario 1.
Alternatively, an insurer might reduce its 
administrative costs, for example from $200 to $120, 
but keep premiums at $1,000, as shown in Scenario 
3. This means profits would increase to $130 ($1,000 
premium – $750 medical claims – $120 admin. costs = 
$130 profits). Even though this insurer would owe the 
same rebate as in the first scenario, it would now have 
more than enough profits from which to pay the same 
$50 or $100 rebate. Thus, the administrative cost sav-
ings would only benefit the insurer, not consumers.
Exhibit 1. Uses of Insurance Premiums—Three Scenarios
Source: Authors’ analysis.
Prot
Administration
Medical claims
Scenario 1—Higher premium
(total premium $1,000)
$50
$200
$750
Scenario 2—Lower premium
(total premium $880)
$30
$100
$750
Scenario 3—Higher prot
(total premium $1,000)
$130
$120
$750
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Thus, to gauge the consumer benefits of the 
new MLR rule, it is important not only to track rebates, 
as others have done, but to look for changes in insur-
ers’ administrative costs and profit margins, even when 
they do not owe rebates. This issue brief does this by 
comparing how health insurers’ administrative costs 
and profit margins changed from 2010, the year just 
before the MLR rule took effect, and 2011, the first 
year under the new rule.
Because this is an uncontrolled “natural experi-
ment,” it is likely that other factors also influenced 
insurers’ behavior in addition to the new MLR rule. 
These may include competitive and state regulatory 
factors, all of which drive insurers’ pricing decisions 
and operational strategies. However, the 2010–11 time 
span is a good test case because this is when insurers 
began to incorporate the new MLR limits into their 
business strategies. Also, during 2011 the rise in medi-
cal costs moderated slightly, to 7.3 percent, down a 
half point from the trend over the prior four years.4 If 
insurers did not anticipate this reduction in their 2011 
pricing, then they would be at greater risk of exceeding 
MLR limits.
Data Sources
Data for this study come from the Supplemental Health 
Care Exhibit in the annual financial reports that nearly 
all health insurers file each year with the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners. Insurers file 
this form for each subsidiary in each state in which 
they sell comprehensive health insurance. In 2010 
and 2011, more than 2,000 health or life insurers filed 
these forms. To observe how plans responded to the 
new MLR rule, we included only those that reported 
data in both years. The final two-year sample consisted 
of 1,219 insurers in the individual market, 804 small-
group insurers, and 750 large-group insurers.
Within each state, we aggregated financial and 
membership data for each market segment (individual, 
small group, and large group) to provide a statewide 
picture of insurers’ financial performance under each of 
the three components of the new MLR rule. (See box  
for more detail on these financial performance measures.)
Measuring Health Insurers’ Financial Performance: A Guide to Terminology
Membership is the average number of people a health plan covers over the course of the year. 
The Affordable Care Act defines small employers as those with 100 or fewer employees, but since many 
states currently define a small employer as having 50 or fewer employees, states are allowed to main-
tain that definition until 2016. Nongroup insurance constitutes the individual market.
Premiums earned are health premiums net of premium taxes and other regulatory assessments. 
Medical expense is net incurred medical claims plus expenses incurred for improving health care quality.
Administrative costs are all nonmedical expenses, including those for sales and claims adjustment, as 
well as general corporate overhead costs (except for health care quality improvement expenses, which 
are counted as medical expenses).
Profit margin is also known as the underwriting gain or loss. It is calculated by subtracting medical 
expense and administrative costs from net premium earned. As such, it does not include profit/loss 
from investments, and does not account for general corporate taxes. A negative profit margin indicates 
that medical and administrative costs exceeded premiums.
Total overhead refers to the component of premium that is not spent on medical costs or improving 
quality of care. It equates simply to the residual of the medical loss ratio, or the sum of administrative 
costs and profit margin.
Unadjusted medical loss ratio measures the percentage of premium that insurers spend on medical 
claims and quality improvement. This ratio does not fully account for several adjustments that insurers 
are permitted to make in calculating whether they comply with the MLR rule or owe a rebate.
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IMPACT OF THE MEDICAL LOSS RATIO 
RULE ACROSS INSURANCE MARKETS
Exhibit 2 presents the overall picture of consumer 
benefits potentially related to the regulation of insur-
ers’ medical loss ratios. The insurers that fell below 
the MLR minimums in 2011 will pay out $1.1 billion 
in rebates. In addition, the insurance industry reduced 
overhead costs by $350 million from 2010 to 2011, 
which could benefit consumers.5 Reduced overhead 
can take the form of lower administrative costs or 
lower profits or both, as explored below. This produced 
a combined consumer benefit of $1.45 billion.
As shown in Exhibit 2, the consumer benefits 
differed across market segments. Also, as shown in 
Exhibit 3, changes in administrative costs, profits, and 
medical loss ratios varied considerably across different 
market segments. The following sections explore these 
key findings for each market segment in more detail.
The Individual Market: Substantial Gains 
for Consumers
Consumers in the individual market benefitted substan-
tially under the new MLR rule. According to govern-
ment reports, insurers that fell below the minimum loss 
ratio will rebate $394 million to consumers in the indi-
vidual market (Exhibit 2).6 In addition, between 2010 
and 2011, health insurers reduced both their adminis-
trative costs and profits, so that the total amount of pre-
mium revenue devoted to overhead, both administra-
tive costs and profits, decreased by $560 million in the 
individual market (Exhibit 2).
This substantial overhead reduction occurred 
even though enrollment in the individual market grew 
by almost a quarter of a million people in 2011. On a 
per capita basis, reduced overhead amounted to $66 
per member ($31 + $35). Of the 35 states with lower 
overhead per member in the individual market, six had 
decreases of more than $200 per member (NM, WV, 
ME, CT, MO, and SC), while only three states (RI, NJ, 
and NC) had increases this large (Appendix Exhibit 1).
This reduction in overhead included a $209 
million reduction in administrative costs, amounting to 
$31 per member.
Thirty-nine states saw reductions in adminis-
trative costs per member, with per-member amounts 
reduced by $99 or more in five states (DE, OH, LA, 
SC, and NY), and $50 or more in 10 other states 
(NV, OK, TX, IL, GA, IN, SD, NC, NM, and CT) 
(Appendix Exhibit 1). Only in Rhode Island and 
Massachusetts did administrative expenses increase 
more than $100 per person.
The other component of reduced overhead was 
lower profit margins, indicating that overall premium 
growth was restrained in the individual market. In 
2010, individual insurers had an operating profit mar-
gin of 0.15 percent overall, but this dropped to an oper-
ating loss of –1.2 percent in 2011, amounting to a $351 
million reduction in operating profits overall (Exhibit 
3). On a per-member basis, individual insurers’ operat-
ing profits diminished (or losses increased) by $35.
Thirty-four states saw reductions in operating 
profits per member (Appendix Exhibit 1). Per-member 
reductions averaged $100 or more in 18 states (NM, 
WV, ME, AR, CT, MO, MS, WI, VA, AZ, TN, WA, 
NE, SC, IN, TX, FL, and VT). Per-member profits 
increased more than this amount in only eight states 
(RI, NC, NJ, DE, ND, WY, MN, and LA).
Consistent with these patterns, the medical loss 
ratio in the individual market increased 3.3 percentage 
points between 2010 and 2011, from 80.8 percent to 
84.1 percent (Exhibit 3), based in part on medical costs 
increasing $159 per member (Appendix Exhibit 1). 
Thirty-seven states saw increases in the overall MLRs 
(unadjusted) for their individual market, with increases 
of 10 percentage points or more in five states (NM, 
MO, WV, TX, and SC). Only Rhode Island saw MLR 
reductions this large.
The Small-Group Market: Cost Savings 
Offset by Higher Profits
Consumers in the small-group market received less 
benefit than those in the individual market under the 
new MLR rule. Small-group insurers that fell below 
the minimum loss ratio rebated a significant amount 
($321 million) to consumers (Exhibit 2). Yet, looking 
at this market segment as a whole, small-group insurers 
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did not reduce their nonmedical overhead, as they did 
in the individual market.
Although small-group insurers reduced their 
administrative costs by $190 million, this contributed 
to higher profits of $226 million (Exhibit 3). Therefore, 
small-group insurers increased by $36 million the 
amount of premium revenue they devoted to total 
overhead in 2011 (Exhibit 2). Total overhead remained 
nearly steady in the small-group market nationwide, 
despite the fact that administrative costs dropped sig-
nificantly, because small-group insurers simultaneously 
increased their profits by a slightly larger amount than 
their administrative cost savings. This indicates that 
they failed to pass these cost savings on to consumers 
in the form of restrained premiums.
Because enrollment also increased in the 
small-group market, this higher total overhead con-
stituted a small reduction of $5.82 in overhead per 
Exhibit 2. Change in Overhead and Rebate Amounts Owed, 2011
Individual Small group Large group Total
Change in overhead, 2010–11 –$560 million $36 million $174 million –$350 million
Rebate owed –$394 million –$321 million –$386 million –$1.1 billion
Total –$954 million –$285 million –$212 million –$1.45 billion
Note: Rebate values are reported by CMS for all health plans, while the change in overhead is computed from the smaller sample of health insurers 
selected for this analysis.
Exhibit 3. Change in Administrative Costs, Profits, and Medical Loss Ratio, 2010 to 2011, by Market Segment
Market segment 2010 2011  Change 
Individual market
Members 9,880,141 10,112,444 232,303
Administrative costs $4,567,499,331 $4,358,591,410 –$208,907,921
Administrative/member $462 $431 –$31
Operating profit $36,869,384 –$313,911,847 –$350,781,231
Profit/member $4 –$31 –$35
Medical loss ratio 80.8% 84.1% 3.3% points
Small-group market
Members 16,929,676 17,145,535 215,859
Administrative costs $8,575,445,177 $8,385,115,996 –$190,329,181
Administrative/member $507 $489 –$17
Operating profit $2,042,246,229 $2,268,122,631 $225,876,402 
Profit/member $121 $132 $12
Medical loss ratio 83.6% 83.6% 0.1% point
Large-group market
Members 37,409,353 37,156,902 –252,451
Administrative costs $12,759,642,743 $11,974,384,975 –$785,257,768
Administrative/member $341 $322 –$19
Operating profit $2,557,131,436 $3,516,388,736 $959,257,300 
Profit/member $68 $95 $26
Medical loss ratio 89.1% 89.2% 0.1% point
Total insured 64,219,170 64,414,881 195,711
Notes: For the individual market, total premiums earned were $23,989,034,449 in 2010 and $25,488,339,831 in 2011, and medical costs 
were $19,384,665,737 and $21,443,660,265, respectively. For the small-group market, total premiums earned were $64,537,517,787 in 2010 
and $65,055,805,260 in 2011, and medical costs were $53,912,749,758 and $54,402,566,483, respectively. For the large-group market, 
total premiums earned were $140,661,963,437 in 2010 and $143,033,750,738 in 2011, and medical costs were $125,367,094,542 and 
$127,542,977,497, respectively.
Source: Authors’ analysis of Supplemental Health Care Exhibit data, National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
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member for the year. Nine states had increases in 
nonmedical overhead of over $100 per member (RI, 
AK, NH, ND, MA, AL, VT, MI, and IA) (Appendix 
Exhibit 2). The six states with the greatest per-member 
decreases (over $100) were KY, PA, NM, DE, VA,  
and NE.
Nationally, the reduction in small-group 
administrative costs amounted to $17 per member in 
2011 (Exhibit 3). Thirty states saw reductions in small-
group administrative costs per member, with per-mem-
ber decreases of $99 or more in three states (LA, NE, 
and NV) and $50 or more in nine other states (WA, 
DE, NC, TX, KY, WI, PA, WV, and VT) (Appendix 
Exhibit 2). Administrative expenses increased more 
than $100 per small-group member in three states 
(MA, AK, and CT) and by more than $50 in four others 
(NJ, MD, MN, and MS).
About half of the states (28) saw increases in 
small-group profits per member (or decreases in losses) 
in 2011 (Appendix Exhibit 2). Among states with lower 
profits, the average per-member reduction was more 
than $100 in only three states (NM, VA, and MD). 
Twelve states (RI, AK, NH, ND, VT, IA, AL, OH, WY, 
NC, NV, and MA) had profit increases of $100 or more 
per member, with Rhode Island topping the list at $897 
per member.
The medical loss ratio (unadjusted) in the 
small-group market was basically constant between 
2010 and 2011, moving only from 83.55 percent to 
83.62 percent (Exhibit 3). Twenty-eight states saw 
increases in the overall MLRs (unadjusted) for their 
small-group market, with increases of two percentage 
points or more in 12 states (NE, VA, DE, UT, WI, NM, 
KY, AZ, MO, WV, OK, and MD) (Appendix Exhibit 
2). Ten states saw MLR reductions of more than two 
percentage points (RI, ND, NH, MA, AK, WY, VT, 
AL, MI, and IA).
The Large-Group Market: Medical Loss 
Ratios Virtually Unchanged
Large-group insurers that fell below the minimum 
MLR in 2011 also paid a significant amount in rebates 
($386 million), but at the same time the amount of 
premium revenue that large-group insurers overall 
devoted to overhead increased by about half this 
amount, to $174 million (Exhibit 2). Even though 
large-group insurers reduced their administrative costs 
by $785 million, they were able to boost profits by 
$959 million (Exhibit 3).
Seven states (MA, RI, WY, WV, HI, MI, and 
NH) incurred overhead increases of more than $100 
per member in the large-group market (Appendix 
Exhibit 3). Twenty-one states decreased their total 
overhead, but only Alaska and Nevada reduced it by 
more than $100 per member. 
On a per-member basis, administrative cost 
reductions were $19 per member but profit increases 
were $26 per member (Exhibit 3). Twenty-six states 
saw reductions in administrative expenses, with per-
member amounts of $99 or more in six states (NV, RI, 
AK, AZ, NJ, and OH), and $50 or more in four other 
states (KY, MO, LA, and WV) (Appendix Exhibit 3). 
In no state did administrative expenses rise more than 
$100 per large-group member. Per-member increases 
were more the $50 in four states (MD, KS, AR, and 
TN).
Nineteen states experienced declines in large-
group operating profits per member in 2011, with 
decreases of more than $100 per member in Alaska 
and $50 or more in five other states (AR, WI, NM, 
MD, and MS) (Appendix Exhibit 3). In 10 states (RI, 
WV, NV, MA, NJ, HI, WY, SC, PA, and NH), insurers 
increased their large-group profits by $99 or more per 
member, with Rhode Island topping the list at $358 per 
member.
The medical loss ratio in the large-group mar-
ket remained virtually unchanged, increasing only 
from 89.11 percent in 2010 to 89.17 percent in 2011 
(Exhibit 3). Large-group insurers were able to increase 
profits and total overhead without lowering the medi-
cal loss ratio market-wide because total medical costs 
also increased a commensurate amount. Twenty-two 
states saw increases in the overall MLRs (unadjusted) 
for their large-group market, with increases of two 
percentage points or more in five states (AK, NV, KY, 
IN, and NE). Seven states saw MLR reductions of 
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this magnitude (HI, RI, MA, WV, WY, MI, and SC) 
(Appendix Exhibit 3).
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The implementation of the MLR rule in 2011 pres-
ents a unique opportunity to observe insurers’ initial 
responses, with a reasonable degree of confidence that 
the new rule was a substantial factor driving changes 
in key financial measures. Nationally, administrative 
costs decreased across all three markets. The greatest 
dollar-value decrease occurred in the large-group mar-
ket, which saw a reduction of more than $785 million 
in administrative costs. Small-group and individual 
insurers decreased their administrative costs by $190 
million and $209 million, respectively.
For the large-group and small-group markets, 
this reduction in administrative costs coincided with 
similar increases in profits between 2010 and 2011, 
of almost $1 billion and $226 million, respectively. A 
different pattern emerged from the individual market, 
where profit margins declined even more than adminis-
trative costs, by $351 million between 2010 and 2011.
Although the MLR rule, along with other 
market and regulatory factors, prompted reductions in 
administrative expenses in all three market segments, 
in the group markets it appears that insurers were able 
to retain those cost reductions in the form of increased 
profits, rather than passing them on to consumers in the 
form of reduced premiums. By contrast, both adminis-
trative costs and profits dropped in the individual mar-
ket, indicating that consumers benefitted in the form of 
restrained premium increases. Premiums did increase 
somewhat, because of the growth in medical costs, but 
the increases were less than medical cost increases.
One possible explanation for this difference 
among the three markets is that meeting the minimum 
MLR in the individual market of 80 percent required 
insurers to cut profits more in that market than in the 
group markets. This is because historical pricing pat-
terns had previously supported MLRs lower than 80 
percent in the individual market, but not in the group 
markets.7 This suggests that, in future years, the MLR 
rule may need to be coupled with regulatory pressure 
in order for any further reductions in administrative 
costs to be reflected in reduced premium rates.8
On the other hand, further pressure on pre-
mium rates might cause some insurers to leave certain 
market segments, if they cannot maintain adequate 
profits. It is possible that some or many insurers 
responded to the new MLR rule by reducing adminis-
trative costs across the board, since many of these costs 
are shared across all lines of business, and not just 
the individual market where insurers were most likely 
to fall below the MLR minimums. In the group mar-
kets, where insurers’ medical claims were closer to or 
already in compliance with the MLR rule, insurers may 
have aimed to set their premium rates at a level that 
generates more profits in order to offset reduced profits 
in the individual market. Going forward, if insurers are 
not able to balance overall profitability in this manner, 
some might choose to withdraw from less-profitable 
market segments, which could leave consumers with 
fewer choices as well as higher premiums.
Regardless of these theoretical concerns, over-
all changes in financial measures that appear related to 
the MLR rule benefitted consumers in 2011 by reduc-
ing insurers’ total overhead—both profit and adminis-
trative costs—by $350 million. The individual market 
contributed the largest component of this decrease 
in total overhead, with a decline of $560 million. 
However, the small- and large-group markets offset a 
third of this decrease by increases in total overhead of 
$36 million and $174 million, respectively, in 2011.
Changes in total overhead varied widely 
among states (Appendix Exhibit 4). Thirty states had 
net reductions of health insurance overhead in 2011, 
with reductions of more than $100 million in five states 
(FL, MD, VA, IL, and WI). However, insurers in four 
states increased their total overhead by more than $100 
million (MA, MI, RI, and CA). Changes in profit mar-
gins, more than in administrative costs, were the pri-
mary drivers of these larger-magnitude increases and 
decreases (see Appendix tables).
The primary aim of the MLR regulation was to 
restrain the proportion of premium dollars that insur-
ers apply to profits and administrative expenses, with 
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the hope that lower overhead will produce lower over-
all premiums (after taking any rebates into account). 
Initially, the new minimum loss ratios appear to be 
producing important consumer benefits in the indi-
vidual market, but much less so in the group markets. 
Although insurers have reduced their administrative 
costs and paid substantial rebates in all three market 
segments, the rule has not reduced total overhead mar-
ket-wide in the small- and large-group segments. For 
that to occur, stronger measures may be needed, either 
in the form of rate regulation, tighter loss ratio rules, or 
enhanced competitive pressures.
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Appendix Exhibit 1. State Individual Markets, 2010–11: Change in Overhead and Medical Loss Ratio (Unadjusted)
State
2010 
members
2011 
members
Change in 
administrative 
expenses 
per member
Change in 
profit 
per member
Change in 
total overhead 
per member
Change in 
medical loss ratio
Alabama 175,518 169,350 $7 –$12 –$5 0.8%
Alaska 15,649 15,235 $16 $24 $40 0.3%
Arizona 253,497 253,724 –$13 –$152 –$165 6.9%
Arkansas 111,068 114,044 $51 –$217 –$166 9.2%
California 968,882 1,065,276 –$14 $88 $74 –1.9%
Colorado 298,559 289,229 –$13 –$43 –$56 5.1%
Connecticut 107,325 108,445 –$50 –$193 –$243 8.1%
Delaware 18,441 17,396 –$127 $227 $101 –1.3%
Florida 830,813 831,538 –$27 –$102 –$129 6.1%
Georgia 351,259 362,320 –$62 –$73 –$135 5.1%
Hawaii 30,882 31,416 $43 $69 $112 –3.2%
Idaho 108,611 103,401 –$27 –$79 –$106 6.0%
Illinois 450,648 452,697 –$73 –$61 –$134 5.9%
Indiana 176,740 172,001 –$62 –$112 –$173 9.1%
Iowa 176,146 175,895 –$8 $55 $47 –0.8%
Kansas 125,665 122,039 –$8 –$22 –$30 2.8%
Kentucky 147,776 140,784 –$33 $55 $23 0.2%
Louisiana 166,262 159,987 –$115 $114 –$1 0.6%
Maine 36,803 34,994 –$4 –$282 –$286 9.1%
Maryland 184,093 180,130 –$17 –$91 –$109 5.4%
Massachusetts 88,896 78,725 $109 $41 $151 –3.9%
Michigan 329,063 321,563 $24 –$76 –$52 3.1%
Minnesota 244,447 241,852 –$3 $197 $194 –7.0%
Mississippi 78,065 76,097 $33 –$174 –$141 6.6%
Missouri 225,539 241,111 –$47 –$189 –$236 11.1%
Montana 52,587 50,817 –$24 –$9 –$33 3.1%
Nebraska 107,847 115,576 –$37 –$113 –$150 6.1%
Nevada 86,270 87,750 –$93 –$68 –$161 7.2%
New Hampshire 34,194 34,621 –$15 –$13 –$28 3.4%
New Jersey 121,781 138,577 $37 $314 $351 –8.0%
New Mexico 61,339 60,550 –$53 –$343 –$395 17.6%
New York 117,398 202,260 –$99 $26 –$72 –1.5%
North Carolina 415,183 416,344 –$53 $314 $261 –9.0%
North Dakota 42,352 41,695 –$20 $206 $186 –6.1%
Ohio 199,845 315,407 –$122 –$75 –$197 8.5%
Oklahoma 119,139 118,141 –$83 –$28 –$111 5.6%
Oregon 184,050 174,076 –$35 –$33 –$68 3.4%
Pennsylvania 469,206 465,854 –$38 –$78 –$116 1.7%
Rhode Island 14,814 15,159 $135 $321 $456 –10.2%
South Carolina 132,301 128,228 –$108 –$112 –$220 9.7%
South Dakota 56,558 65,555 –$60 $89 $29 –2.3%
Tennessee 232,206 240,617 –$43 –$143 –$186 8.6%
Texas 725,812 700,592 –$76 –$109 –$185 10.8%
Utah 140,697 137,886 $46 –$39 $7 0.3%
Vermont 17,453 18,229 –$6 –$102 –$107 2.3%
Virginia 315,788 313,030 –$3 –$153 –$156 6.6%
Washington 314,314 296,410 $29 –$114 –$86 4.6%
West Virginia 20,649 20,915 –$15 –$312 –$327 11.1%
Wisconsin 173,385 172,926 –$3 –$163 –$166 7.2%
Wyoming 24,329 21,984 –$12 $201 $189 –4.5%
Source: Authors’ analysis of Supplemental Health Care Exhibit data, National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
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Appendix Exhibit 2. State Small–Group Markets, 2010–11: Change in Overhead and Medical Loss Ratio (Unadjusted)
State
2010 
members
2011 
members
Change in 
administrative 
expenses 
per member
Change in 
profit 
per member
Change in 
total overhead 
per member
Change in 
medical loss ratio
Alabama 332,412 309,161 $5 $137 $142 –2.6%
Alaska 27,190 33,921 $149 $339 $488 –3.8%
Arizona 305,124 232,276 $13 –$85 –$72 2.6%
Arkansas 124,401 106,979 –$31 $6 –$25 1.3%
California 727,469 710,453 $42 –$50 –$8 0.5%
Colorado 291,540 266,543 –$38 $28 –$10 0.4%
Connecticut 303,179 266,985 $113 –$57 $56 –0.1%
Delaware 54,972 53,838 –$84 –$46 –$131 3.7%
Florida 884,855 856,603 $46 –$89 –$44 1.6%
Georgia 507,948 607,415 –$38 $3 –$36 1.3%
Hawaii 188,455 148,224 –$47 $34 –$14 0.1%
Idaho 99,246 90,401 $16 –$26 –$10 1.2%
Illinois 708,032 605,224 –$43 $21 –$22 1.4%
Indiana 280,751 347,145 –$42 $62 $20 1.1%
Iowa 203,942 175,660 –$29 $141 $112 –2.1%
Kansas 246,865 194,286 $47 $11 $58 1.3%
Kentucky 183,042 194,844 –$63 –$37 –$100 2.6%
Louisiana 309,516 290,308 –$99 $77 –$22 1.4%
Maine 93,616 85,588 $11 –$48 –$37 0.7%
Maryland 415,495 341,518 $85 –$153 –$68 2.1%
Massachusetts 663,965 597,772 $150 $100 $250 –4.2%
Michigan 492,508 488,374 $30 $86 $115 –2.4%
Minnesota 272,651 250,596 $63 –$50 $13 –0.4%
Mississippi 121,942 117,319 $62 $0 $63 –1.5%
Missouri 386,154 333,902 –$11 –$54 –$65 2.5%
Montana 57,292 52,142 –$7 $97 $90 –1.0%
Nebraska 92,257 102,049 –$133 –$88 –$221 6.4%
Nevada 119,740 105,769 –$182 $102 –$80 0.4%
New Hampshire 107,030 94,616 $38 $306 $344 –6.9%
New Jersey 813,777 721,092 $87 –$20 $66 –1.4%
New Mexico 80,242 63,915 $6 –$110 –$104 2.9%
New York 1,767,668 1,587,978 $35 –$53 –$18 0.7%
North Carolina 439,262 367,685 –$64 $107 $42 –0.2%
North Dakota 82,751 64,548 $21 $263 $284 –7.6%
Ohio 720,129 937,425 –$45 $121 $76 –0.8%
Oklahoma 184,925 177,017 –$47 –$30 –$77 2.2%
Oregon 233,830 232,191 –$43 $27 –$17 1.0%
Pennsylvania 908,386 1,201,661 –$58 –$45 –$103 1.2%
Rhode Island 101,552 92,244 $35 $897 $932 –20.4%
South Carolina 194,645 169,886 –$44 $85 $41 –0.2%
South Dakota 54,800 50,647 –$7 $92 $85 –1.5%
Tennessee 419,394 382,530 –$30 $38 $9 –0.2%
Texas 1,144,689 1,343,799 –$63 $81 $18 –0.5%
Utah 209,344 240,604 –$23 –$49 –$72 3.1%
Vermont 66,264 64,256 –$52 $186 $134 –3.0%
Virginia 461,741 412,492 –$9 –$143 –$151 3.9%
Washington 232,193 300,975 –$95 $98 $3 –0.3%
West Virginia 68,938 68,051 –$52 –$44 –$96 2.4%
Wisconsin 333,530 364,504 –$61 –$27 –$88 3.1%
Wyoming 25,885 26,266 –$24 $112 $88 –3.2%
Source: Authors’ analysis of Supplemental Health Care Exhibit data, National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
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Appendix Exhibit 3. State Large–Group Markets, 2010–11: Change in Overhead and Medical Loss Ratio (Unadjusted)
State
2010 
members
2011 
members
Change in 
administrative 
expenses 
per member
Change in 
profit 
per member
Change in 
total overhead 
per member
Change in 
medical loss ratio
Alabama 512,228 505,606 $0 $9 $9 –0.5%
Alaska 55,687 47,775 –$144 –$118 –$262 3.2%
Arizona 463,743 636,095 –$114 $52 –$62 –0.7%
Arkansas 220,834 236,648 $63 –$50 $13 –0.2%
California 950,761 994,155 $13 –$16 –$2 0.2%
Colorado 719,548 700,315 $31 $15 $46 –0.1%
Connecticut 532,349 458,372 –$2 $53 $51 –0.7%
Delaware 105,987 100,709 $2 $23 $24 0.1%
Florida 1,995,997 1,955,447 –$14 –$6 –$20 0.6%
Georgia 1,037,482 912,580 –$19 $69 $50 –0.8%
Hawaii 456,432 507,338 $13 $136 $148 –4.2%
Idaho 229,887 228,672 $15 $13 $28 –0.9%
Illinois 2,024,382 2,112,604 –$27 $20 –$7 0.1%
Indiana 488,523 378,092 –$38 –$34 –$72 2.2%
Iowa 358,492 371,557 $0 $41 $41 –0.5%
Kansas 482,546 435,484 $67 –$16 $50 –0.2%
Kentucky 409,444 386,609 –$67 –$7 –$74 2.2%
Louisiana 279,031 306,116 –$57 $80 $23 0.0%
Maine 192,210 196,022 –$7 $30 $23 –0.2%
Maryland 1,174,040 1,043,295 $70 –$66 $4 1.3%
Massachusetts 1,035,923 1,039,540 $34 $167 $201 –3.5%
Michigan 1,890,804 1,847,597 $27 $79 $106 –2.6%
Minnesota 688,017 674,328 $31 $3 $34 –0.4%
Mississippi 172,125 183,418 $20 –$71 –$50 1.3%
Missouri 594,334 757,844 –$82 $43 –$38 –0.7%
Montana 95,958 100,311 –$22 $9 –$14 0.6%
Nebraska 217,836 198,405 –$4 –$43 –$47 2.1%
Nevada 357,677 429,515 –$311 $172 –$138 2.9%
New Hampshire 157,108 157,447 $1 $99 $100 -1.6%
New Jersey 1,253,213 1,152,110 –$105 $148 $43 -0.4%
New Mexico 174,100 176,554 $39 –$60 –$21 1.1%
New York 5,560,613 6,400,998 –$25 –$19 –$44 1.6%
North Carolina 536,181 576,318 –$29 –$3 –$31 1.0%
North Dakota 119,677 141,277 $19 –$17 $2 0.1%
Ohio 1,396,134 1,057,022 –$99 $92 –$8 1.2%
Oklahoma 420,989 433,735 –$34 $89 $55 –1.3%
Oregon 723,428 696,862 $13 $56 $68 –1.3%
Pennsylvania 1,799,593 1,591,436 –$33 $103 $70 –0.8%
Rhode Island 186,464 186,395 –$179 $358 $179 –3.8%
South Carolina 345,864 361,047 –$25 $105 $80 –2.0%
South Dakota 111,136 110,234 $13 $45 $58 –0.9%
Tennessee 495,692 480,605 $60 $31 $91 0.0%
Texas 2,124,845 1,826,768 –$8 $12 $5 –0.3%
Utah 511,573 468,431 –$10 –$9 –$19 1.4%
Vermont 74,905 73,717 –$34 –$14 –$48 1.4%
Virginia 1,150,750 1,218,835 $4 –$27 –$23 0.9%
Washington 1,337,594 1,226,963 $10 –$29 –$18 1.0%
West Virginia 138,675 128,484 –$53 $203 $151 –3.4%
Wisconsin 1,014,466 912,087 $13 –$54 –$41 1.3%
Wyoming 34,074 35,127 $36 $121 $157 –3.0%
Source: Authors’ analysis of Supplemental Health Care Exhibit data, National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
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Appendix Exhibit 4. Change in Total Overhead, 2010 to 2011
State Individual market Small-group market Large-group market Total
Alabama –$1,736,364 $34,944,728 $2,448,760 $35,657,124
Alaska $346,664 $21,381,288 –$17,460,860 $4,267,092
Arizona –$41,815,000 –$65,270,334 $37,031,681 –$70,053,654
Arkansas –$17,456,425 –$15,664,502 $8,932,602 –$24,188,325
California $113,527,355 –$15,085,396 $18,478,378 $116,920,337
Colorado –$20,040,244 –$18,317,325 $23,972,397 –$14,385,173
Connecticut –$25,576,960 –$14,802,315 –$19,652,743 –$60,032,018
Delaware $1,108,575 –$8,032,928 $222,414 –$6,701,938
Florida –$106,688,662 –$61,600,455 –$61,348,855 –$229,637,971
Georgia –$43,353,097 $39,618,168 $2,852,940 –$881,989
Hawaii $3,600,502 –$19,712,613 $80,300,402 $64,188,291
Idaho –$13,387,370 –$5,568,582 $6,136,809 –$12,819,143
Illinois –$59,371,936 –$97,268,965 $24,832,103 –$131,808,797
Indiana –$32,654,220 $56,684,771 –$81,035,260 –$57,004,709
Iowa $8,125,492 $3,609,325 $20,160,057 $31,894,874
Kansas –$5,269,383 –$14,166,767 $5,887,870 –$13,548,280
Kentucky –$572,817 –$10,964,856 –$39,635,681 –$51,173,354
Louisiana –$3,622,847 –$19,670,384 $17,935,159 –$5,358,073
Maine –$11,205,945 –$7,138,775 $6,104,518 –$12,240,203
Maryland –$21,406,187 –$82,441,146 –$51,905,187 –$155,752,520
Massachusetts $14,998,633 $119,065,046 $210,230,238 $344,293,918
Michigan –$18,851,531 $53,958,473 $180,465,593 $215,572,535
Minnesota $46,529,050 –$9,336,336 $18,516,701 $55,709,415
Mississippi –$11,976,934 $5,579,298 –$5,301,012 –$11,698,648
Missouri –$46,881,564 –$62,362,996 $63,004,621 –$46,239,939
Montana –$2,454,316 $1,064,890 –$95,159 –$1,484,585
Nebraska –$13,581,075 –$13,596,162 –$17,488,257 –$44,665,494
Nevada –$13,144,251 –$19,375,553 –$25,210,583 –$57,730,387
New Hampshire –$606,754 $28,170,878 $15,920,910 $43,485,035
New Jersey $53,342,366 –$13,243,640 –$11,143,934 $28,954,792
New Mexico –$24,196,622 –$18,787,817 –$2,854,792 –$45,839,231
New York $17,254,051 –$92,135,902 –$20,363,154 –$95,245,005
North Carolina $108,848,505 –$30,038,883 $2,578,070 $81,387,693
North Dakota $7,731,190 $12,614,707 $5,647,323 $25,993,220
Ohio $8,259,570 $183,018,963 –$155,082,419 $36,196,114
Oklahoma –$13,716,571 –$20,230,541 $29,162,395 –$4,784,718
Oregon –$14,588,479 –$4,793,011 $37,778,733 $18,397,244
Pennsylvania –$55,131,863 $73,908,437 $14,561,295 $33,337,869
Rhode Island $7,042,816 $83,851,290 $33,404,605 $124,298,711
South Carolina –$31,300,240 –$9,732,449 $33,457,694 –$7,574,996
South Dakota $4,837,257 $2,669,923 $6,093,243 $13,600,423
Tennessee –$40,018,093 –$20,193,092 $38,058,450 –$22,152,735
Texas –$146,773,991 $158,558,316 –$105,547,218 –$93,762,893
Utah –$12,090 $829,999 –$22,629,260 –$21,811,351
Vermont –$1,625,259 $7,893,465 –$4,146,622 $2,121,584
Virginia –$50,744,050 –$105,425,290 $1,506,713 –$154,662,627
Washington –$32,828,629 $39,044,524 –$75,249,667 –$69,033,771
West Virginia –$6,570,826 –$7,332,276 $15,581,781 $1,678,679
Wisconsin –$29,002,259 –$11,245,815 –$76,879,978 –$117,128,051
Wyoming $2,921,674 $2,615,838 $5,765,714 $11,303,226
United States –$559,689,152 $35,547,221 $173,999,532 –$350,142,400
Source: Authors’ analysis of Supplemental Health Care Exhibit data, National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
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